AbstracbAn ad hoc wireless network is an autonomous selforganizing system of mobile nodes connected by wireless links where nudes nut in direct range communicate via intermediary nodes. Routing in ad hoc networks is a challenging problem as a result of highly dynamic topology as well as bandwidth and energy constraints. The Swarm Intelligence paradigm has recently been demonstrated as an effective approach fur routing in small static network configurations with no adversarial iutervention. These algorithms have atso been proven tu he robust and resilient tu changes in nude configuration. However, none of the existing routing algorithms can withstand a dynamic proactive adversarial attack, where the network may be completely controlled by hyzantine adversaries.
I. INTRODUCTION
The motivation for this work is to design robust routing for wired overlay networks or mobile ad hoc wireless networks (MANET'S). Although routing in ad hoc wireless networks has unique aspects, many of the security problems faced in ad hoc routing protocols are similar to those faced by wired networks. Wireless security issues are more acute, due to the inherent vulnerabilities of a wireless environment and are the focus of this paper; however our ideas are applicable to wired overlay networks as well.
In general, routing protocols are susceptible to a wide variety of attacks. A malicious node may advertise false routing information, try to redirect routes, or perform a denial of service attack by engaging a node in resource consuming activities such as routing packets in a loop. Furthermore, due to their cooperative nature and the broadcast medium, ad hoc wireless networks are more vulnerable to attacks in practice PI.
A great deal of work has been done in terms of guaranteeing practical security considerations in existing network protocols. In practice, adversarial attacks observed and documented in ad hoc networks might not be overly sophisticated. The ease of access to the medium has allowed extremely basic attacks to cause a great deal of damage. Consequently, such attacks can be thwarted by simple yet effective methods. For example: a mis-routing attack can be easily detected by authenticating the packet path; consistent traffic blocking can eventually he detected; a single adversary that does not collude can be detected by its neighbors; trusted servers or sensors an be used to monitor tNthfulneSS of link state databases, etc. For each of these important special cases, a lot of great work was done, which is extremely important in practice. However, existing work does not come anywhere close in either addressing the sophisticated attacks arising in our dynamic adversarial model, or attempting to prove analytical bounds on packet loss.
Our Contribution: The goal of this paper is to design an ondemand flooding-free routing protocol in a dynamic byzantine adversarial environment. We propose a generic framework for routing protocols which are appropriate for networks operating under this extremely strong adversarial model. Such strong models have not been considered in the literature to the best of our knowledge. In fact, one does not even need to consider the full power of byzantine attacks. Even relatively benign adaptive dynamic denial of service attacks are already sufficient to break most existing algorithmic work.
What is remarkable about our result is the ability to prove near-optimality bounds under completely arbitrai-j adversarial behavior, with essentially no assumptions about either the network, or the underlying security infrastructure. We use techniques similar to the "Swarm Intelligence" and Distributed Reinforcement Learning paradigm. Swarm Intelligence is a set of learning and biologically-inspired approaches to solve hard optimization problems using distributed cooperative agents. Motivation comes from work which explored the behaviors of ants and how they coordinate each others selections of routes based on a pheromone secretion.
As in [15], one can imagine a model of network routing, such that the network is populated by artificial ants (packets) that make use of the trail laying principle; at each node an ant encounters on the journey to its destination, it leaves an amount of pheromone which evaporates with time, but is an increasing function of the frequency of traversal of that location. The ant then selects the next node on its journey on the basis of the local pheromone distribution [15] . The routing decision is determined by these pheromone distributions.
In our Byzantine routing approach, we act similarly: the process of route detection and fault avoidance is camed out by a distributed process of "learning" fault free paths, in spite of deceptive techniques pursued by adversaries. The routing process creates and adjusts a probability distribution at each node for the node's neighbors. The probability associated with a neighbor reflects the relative likelihood of that neighbor forwarding and eventually delivering the packet to the destination.
MAJOR IDEAS OF OUR ALGORITHM
The algorithm we present is executed at each source node with respect to a specific destination. The actual data packets are source routed and the source route is protected using an onion encryption technique. Every source is maintaining its own graph and probabilities of reaching specific destinations. This information is not shared between nodes because of the byzantine adversarial model which is assumed. Source nodes only rely on other nodes in the network to forward packets and return acknowledgments. It is also assumed that the nodes may choose not to forward the packets or not to retum acknowledgements and the source adjusts its probability distribution accordingly. It is important to note that this approach does not rely on intermediary nodes to make hop by hop routing decisions as in other approaches, since those approaches are sure to fail under this strong model. The following description provides an overview of the major ideas of our algorithm.
The main idea of this algorithm is the use of a "Distributed Reinforcement Learning" technique. Specifically, each node is attempting to pick a parent edge towards the source. The set of all parent edges forms a tree rooted at the source. The packets are sent on the unique path in this tree from the sender (the root) to the receiver, and are being acknowledged by the receiver. However, a potential failure may decompose the path into two parts: the part closest to the source that succeeded to acknowledge the packet, and the rest of the path that failed to return an acknowledgement. We now adjust the choice of parent edges as follows. The part of the path that succeeds in acking reinforces its confidence in the parent, while the other part of the path reduces its Confidence. The parent will be chosen probabilistically based on the confidences acquired.
The intuition is that confidence in the parent reflects not only the reliability of the link between child and parent, but also the fact that the parent is "intelligent" enough to pick the right (grand)-parent. In this context, there is no way to distinguish byzantine nodes from nodes that are unlucky in choosing their parent. Notice that by authenticating all messages, byzantine nodes are limited in their ability to mislead the source since some edge controlled by the adversary must be exposed to the source, each time an edge fails. The adversary can choose nor to expose itself, and indeed this complicates the proof somewhat. We need to show that the adversary has nothing to gain from taking control of an edge, and then not killing packets on this edge. By using a probabilistic distribution over the parent edges we generate a probability distribution over all source-rooted trees, such that probability of each tree is growing exponential in its performance. This discriminates edges controlled by the adversary, and "reinforces" edges where the adversary is absent. More intuition can he obtained by work on non-stochastic multi-armed bandit [I] and its distributed analog in [2].
SIMULATION RESULTS
In order to substantiate the claims made in this work, simulations were conducted to investigate the convergence time of the algorithm. The simulations were conducted by developing a simple program which would simulate the decision making process of the algorithm and examine its performance against adversarial inputs. The simulation consisted of a source selecting a path to the destination at each unit of time. An adversarial model would then select which nodes at the current unit of time were faulty. The packet would traverse the graph and receive positive feedback from the destination if there were no faulty nodes on the path, or from the last non-faulty node before the packet was dropped. Using this feedback the algorithm would adjust its probabilities and compute a new path for the next packet.
A. Simple Configuration
The first set of simulations consisted of 10,000 packets which were sent from the source to the destination. The nodes were arranged as indicated in figure 1. The intermediary nodes are labelled 0 through 5 and their fault rates are indicated. At every unit of time each node was probabilistically selected to fail based on the nodes fault rate. On this particular simple configuration the optimal path would he from the source to node I , from node 1 to node 3, and then from node 3 to node 5. The results of the simulation are the sources estimated link preference metrics at every unit of time. The experiment was run for different values of p, which is the base of the exponent described in the algorithm specification. As the value of @ decreases, the algorithm responds faster to changes and is able to converge faster. However, as the algorithm responds faster it begins to resemble the greedy algorithm which has vulnerabilities. In order to explore the effects of p on the convergence time of the algorithm, multiple experiments were run with the same adversarial input. The results are indicated 
Fig. 3. Simple Configuration Results
in Figures 2,3 , and 4. These figures show the probability of the source selecting a specific edge at every unit of time.
With p3.5 the results show that the source is slowly realizing which path is correct and is sending a majority of its traffic over the correct sequence of nodes. Notice that once the algorithm converged it was sending approximately 90% of its traffic across the first hop to node 1 which was experiencing a 5% loss rate and only 10% of its traffic to node 2 which had a 10% loss rate. While this seems reasonable, notice the convergence when 8a.l or better yet 0.05. With these values the source is able to completely differentiate between nodes and converge quickly on the best path. Since the algorithm is continuously exploring sub-optimal paths with a small fraction of its traffic, this low value of 0 allows it to react quickly as the adversary changes its fault pattern. While the optimal algorithm might know the fault pattern ahead of time, the algorithm we present is able to follow it very closely. If the speed at which the adversary moves is slightly slower then our decision making process, then our algorithm would in fact follow the optimal at every step.
In order to investigate the effects of the sampling percentage on the convergence time an additional experiment was done using the same simple configuration described above, but with the sampling rate decreased from 10% to 1%. The results of this experiment are indicated in Figure 5 . It appears that the lower sampling rate inhibits the algorithms ability to converge as well as the 10% sampling rate indicated in the 
B. Simulation Con3guration
The previous example provided a demonstration of the effects of various parameters on the performance of our algorithm. While the previous example showed the convergence of the algorithm, it is somewhat less interesting since the example consisted of a small set of both nodes and links.
In this example we consider a network with 25 nodes forming a 10 layered graph, with 3 nodes at each layer (except at the source and destination). The topology of the network is indicated in Figure 6 . In this example there is exists one optimal path from the source to the destination which experiences no loss. This optimal path is indicated in Figure  6 by the bold line. All other links in the network exhibit 10% loss, meaning that when we sample them they will successfully forward the packet 90% of the time. This network topology contains 1394 possible paths of which only one is optimal and the the others have total loss rates ranging from 19% to 61% depending on how many optimal links they contain. This setup should be challenging for our algorithm due to the large number of total paths, and due to the fact that the non-optimal links in the sampled path only experience marginal loss.
This simulation consisted of a source attempting to deliver 10,000 packets to the destination. The graphs in Figure 7 shows the results using the algorithm parameters of 10% random sampling and a 0 of 0.05. This graph consists of a line for each link io the network. The lines representing the optimal links are colored in green and the lines representing the the non-optimal links are red. The vertical axis of the graph represents the probability that our algorithm will select The results indicate that the algorithm begins to shift towards using the optimal links immediately, and is able to almost fully converge to the optimal path after approximately 1000 packets are sent. Once the algorithm has learned the best path it is able to send approximately 99% of its traffic successfully to the destination. The graph visually indicates this by showing the sources link preferences at every unit of time. When the simulation begins the source considers all of the links in the network to be equal and then learns their reliability by sending traffic across the links and receiving feedback. As the number of packets (or trials) increases the sources knowledge of the network continuously becomes more accurate. This is evident as the reliable paths become separated from the less reliable paths and selected with near 100% probability. Since the source is continuously sampling the less desirable edges it is able to respond quickly to changes in the adversarial fault panem. [51, [161, [71, [61, [131, [151, VI, [SI, [IO], [31.
IV. RELATED WORK

V. CONCLUSION
In this work we have presented an online algorithm which is based on the Swarm Intelligence paradigm and Distributed Reinforcement Learning approach. Through mathematical analysis and simulation results we have shown the algorithms competitive pelformance under a strong adversarial model consisting of dynamic proactive adversarial attacks, where the network may be completely controlled by hyzantine adversaries.
The results of this work indicate validity of our approach and motivate the need for future work in this direction. We intend on implementing this protocol in a more realistic simulation environment and exploring the effects of both mobility and more sophisticated active adversarial attacks on the algorithm.
